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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Department erred in finding that Appellant could 
not "spend down" his assets to become eligible for Medicaid? 
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF 
ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Allen v, Utah Dept. of Health, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App. 
Mar. 17, 1992). 
Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health. Case No. 910287-CA (Utah Ct. 
App. filed Mar. 17, 1992). 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, identified above, which affirmed the "Final Agency Action 
and Order on Review" of the Utah Department of Health, Division of 
Health Care Financing, Rod Betit, Director, dated April 29, 1991, 
in Case No. 91-067-01 and the "Response to Request for 
Reconsideration" of the Utah Department of Health Care Financing, 
Rod Betit, Director, dated June 6, 1991, in Case No. 91-067-01. 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16, 78-
2a-4 (1953 & Supp. 1990). (This is a petition to review an 
administrative agency order having the priority of argument 
designated under Rule 29(b)(15) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
2 
Procedure.) 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONSf STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Administrative Code R810-304-411 (1991). 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396 (Law. Co-op. 1985). 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(34) (Law. Co-op. 1985). 
(See Appendix for copies of these provisions.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a denial of Medicaid assistance dated 
February 19, 1991. Record, at 113 (hereinafter "R"). A prehearing 
conference was held on March 12, 1991. R. 108. A hearing was held 
on April 3, 1991. Appellant, Doyce Allen (hereinafter "Allen") was 
not represented by counsel at his administrative hearing. R. 97. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts 
On April 29, 1991, Allen, received an unfavorable "Final 
Agency Action and Order on Review," which found that Allen was over 
the asset limit for Medicaid coverage. R. 94-106. A "Response to 
Request for Reconsideration," dated June 6, 1991, confirmed this 
decision. R. 78-80. 
Medicaid assistance having been denied at the agency level, 
this appeal followed. R. 88-91. Allen was not represented by 
counsel until after this appeal was filed. R. 84-85, 88-91. 
3 
Relevant Facts Supported by Citations to the 
Record and to the Opinion of the Court of Appeals 
Doyce Allen is 64 years old. R. 7, 98. He had a heart attack 
on January 23, 1991. R. 5; Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, Case No. 
910287-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1992) [hereafter 
Allen]. . He is also ineligible for Medicare because he is not 65 
years old yet. R. 9-10. Allen had worked for years at 
Intermountain Farmers and had been covered by Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield insurance. R. 98. After retirement and after his insurance 
benefits were ending, Allen worked part-time at Intermountain 
Farmers to save money to pay premiums for Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
insurance, which he was denied on account of previous heart 
surgery. R. 6, 33-37, 124-28 (application). Allen considered the 
price of any other insurance to be prohibitive. R. 37. It also 
appeared that any other insurance company may have denied coverage 
regardless of the amount of the premium he would have been willing 
to pay. R. 98. 
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. R. 
11, 98; Allen, at 1. His application included a request for 
retroactive benefits for January 1991, to cover approximately 
$40,000.00 in medical bills incurred at Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center. R. 11-13, 98; Allen, at 1. These bills relate to 
4 
Allen's heart attack. R. 11; Allen. at 1. By the time he was 
admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for open-heart 
surgery, Allen was already obligated for $4,997.55 to Air Evac for 
air ambulance services rendered on January 26, 1991, in Phoenix, 
Arizona; $554.00 to Dr. Nudelman for critical care given on January 
23-26, 1991; and, $9,649.10 to Havasu Samaritan Regional Hospital 
for hospitalization from January 23-26, 1991. R. 133-37, 140. 
Thereafter he incurred medical bills in the amounts of $304.50 to 
Valley Ambulance, Inc. for life flight on January 26, 1991; 
$1,495.00 to Dr. Frischknecht for hospital treatment from January 
26-February 1, 1991; $5,025.00 to Dr. Smith for treatment on 
January 27, 1991; $23,626.58 to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
for hospitalization from January 26, 1991 to February 1, 1991. R. 
138-39, 141-44. 
An analysis of Allen's assets found that he and his wife held 
$3,029.00 in a savings account and $100.00 in a checking account 
as of the first moment of each of the months of January and 
February, 1991. R. 98; Allen at 1-2. It was also found that Allen 
owned a 1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately $2,500.00, 
which could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile and 
a $7,000.00, 1981 travel trailer. R. 98; Allen at 2. 
Allen was denied Medicaid by the Office of Family Support 
because his resources were $10,745.90 and the resource limit was 
5 
$3,000.00. R. 113; Allen at 2. Following a fair hearing, the 
Department affirmed the decision of the Office of Family Support, 
finding that Allen's savings account exceeded the limit. R. 99; 
Allen at 2. The value ascribed to Allen's motor vehicles and 
travel trailer were not considered necessary to sustain a denial. 
R. 99.1 However, it was argued and left undecided whether the 
truck and travel trailer could be excluded as medical necessities 
for Allen's wife. R. 52-59, 67-68, 98. 
An issue was also raised as to whether the savings account 
fund was being held for burial expenses. R. 68-69. The Court of 
Appeals held that the savings account was not an exempt burial 
fund. Allen at 2-4. 
An additional issue was raised that Allen should have been 
allowed to "spend down" his assets in order to qualify for 
Medicaid. R. 130. At the hearing it was found that "spenddowns" 
are only permitted with regard to income, not assets. R. 16-19. 
He also incurred many medical bills in January prior to his 
surgery, which he could have spent down. R. 135-45. The Court of 
Appeals, one judge dissenting, found that a resource spenddown is 
not available in Utah. Allen at 12-13. 
x
. It appears that there is no "scope of service" problem 
and that Appellant's open-heart surgery would be paid for by 
Medicaid if he was found eligible. R. 22. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT A RESOURCE 
SPENDDOWN WAS NOT REQUIRED IN A REASONABLE EVALUATION OF 
A MEDICAID RECIPIENT'S RESOURCES. 
The Court of Appeals panel majority rejected Allen's argument 
that his savings account was a burial fund and it further rejected 
the argument that Allen should have been allowed to spend down his 
resources. Allen does not seek review of the panel's ruling on the 
burial fund in this petition, but contends that the Court of 
Appeals' decision regarding a resource spenddown is an important 
question of state and federal law which should be settled by the 
Supreme Court. Utah Rules of Appellate Procdure, Rule 46(d). 
The nature of the Medicaid program and the distinction between 
"categorically needy" and "medically needy" are well presented in 
the previous briefing and in the Court of Appeals' opinion. The 
majority panel correctly notes that an income spend down has always 
been required, but that courts are split as to whether a resource 
spend down is a necessary part of the medically needy program. 
The parties are in agreement that a resource spend down is 
permitted under the Medicaid statute; The key question is whether 
it is required as a necessary part of a Medicaid plan. 
The panel majority erred in focusing its attention on whether 
the Utah Medicaid Plan, or the Utah legislature, had "adopted" a 
resource spenddown. Allen has never contended that a resource 
7 
spenddown was formally adopted by the legislature. Instead, he has 
maintained throughout that a spend down of resources must be 
allowed, if determinations of eligibility are to be reasonably 
done. The majority panel engaged in a fruitless search of the Utah 
Medical Assistance Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 et. seq., for 
language to guide its resolution of the resource spend down issue. 
Predictably, it found nothing, since the legislature has delegated 
to the Department of Health Care Financing (DHCF) complete 
administrative authority over the entire Medicaid program. Not 
only does the statute under review say nothing about a "resource 
spend down", it does not even mention the medically needy program. 
It is a futile exercise to search for guidance on this issue in a 
statute which says nothing about the purpose of the medically needy 
program or any other program operated under Medicaid. As Judge 
Bench correctly pointed out in dissent, the section of the Utah 
code surveyed by the majority panel regarding economy and 
efficiency in the administration of the Medicaid program "does not 
have any logical relationship to the intended coverage of the 
program". (Emphasis in the original). Allen. at 12. 
The majority panel is also incorrect in concluding that the 
state court decisions which have upheld a resource spenddown have 
found some explicit authorization in a state statute. The two 
cases reviewed by the panel, Haley v. Commissioner of Public 
8 
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E. 2d. 572 (1985) and Hess ion v. 
Illinois Department of Public Aid, 129 111. 2d. 535, 544 N.E. 2d. 
751 (1989) reviewed general statutory language regarding the intent 
of a medically needy program to preserve the limited resources of 
indigent clients, but the statute did not explicitly address the 
application of a "resource spend down" in a medically needy 
program.2 
The majority panel was also influenced by language in the 
Hession opinion to the effect that the Illinois legislature noted 
it was "of special importance that [medically needy recipients'] 
incentives for continued independence be maintained and that their 
limited resources be preserved." Allen, at 10. Such a purpose is 
implicit whenever a state authorizes participation in the Medicaid 
program. Having authorized such participation typically a state 
leaves it to the state Medicaid agency to determine which optional 
programs it will make available to its eligible recipients. In 
Utah's case, the DHCF has chosen to operate a medically needy 
program, which results in the additional spending of several 
million dollars. The Utah legislature has never disapproved of 
Contrary to the panel's statement, the statute "explicitly 
applying a resource spenddown" in Haley. concerned the availability 
of this rule in a transfer of assets situation. This is a rare 
circumstance, and not the more general set of circumstances under 
review in this case. Haley, 476 N.E. 2d at 579, n. 9 as cited in 
Allen, at 10. 
9 
DHCF's decision to offer a medically needy option. It is DHCF 
which decides whether to allow a resource spenddown. 
The authority delegated to DHCF to operate a Medicaid program 
carries with it the responsibility to comply with the Medicaid Act 
so that its purpose will be carried out. The purpose of Title XIX 
is "to furnish . . . medical assistance on behalf of families with 
dependent children and of aged, blind or disabled individuals, 
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396 (Law. Co-op. 
1985).3 Title XIX "was "designed to liberalize Federal law . . . 
so as to make medical services for the needy more generally 
available.'" Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 394 Mass. 
466, 475, 476 N.E.2d 572, 578 (1985) (quoting Sen. Rep. 404, 89th 
Cong. 1st Sess.), reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
1943, 2014. "[T]o fulfill this goal, Congress sought to ensure 
eligibility to individuals with income and resources which 
prevented eligibility for other programs when the income and 
3Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-2.1 and 26-18-3(2) (1989) 
specifically incorporate Title XIX and other federal law and 
regulations into Utah's Medicaid program. This implies that a 
resource spenddown is also necessary to fulfill the purposes of 
Utah's Medicaid program. Another court has likewise found that a 
resource spenddown is required by a state law provision which 
parallels and implements the federal objective contained in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396. Hession 163 111. App. 2d at 559-61, 516 N.E.2d at 
824. 
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resources were exceeded by incurred medical costs." Id. at 475, 
476 N.E.2d at 578 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17)) . In this case 
Allen's liquid assets put him $129.00 over the limit, not counting 
his vehicles which were arguably exempt. The bills for his 
necessary medical services were over $40,000. R. 11-13, 98, 113. 
By refusing to require a resource spend down, the majority panel 
defeats the purpose of Title XIX as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396, 
since the expenses of Allen's emergency medical services can only 
be met by exhausting all of his resources. Not even the $3000 in 
assets protected under the medically needy program will be spared. 
Congressional intent to include a resource spenddown in the 
Medicaid Act is also found in the provision allowing retroactive 
application to establish eligibility for the three months before 
the month of application. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(34) (Law. Co-op 
1985). By this provision, Congress intended to make medical 
assistance available to applicants who were unable to apply at the 
time they became ill, due to the severity of their illness or 
because of other factors. It is consistent with congressional 
intent to allow an applicant both the right and some time to spend 
down excess assets so as to become eligible for medical assistance. 
If Mr. Allen had been informed of the spenddown requirements, he 
would have spent down his excess assets for his medical expenses 
within that month, thereby making himself eligible for medical 
11 
assistance. He was already obligated for over $15,000 of medical 
bills (far in excess of his assets) by the time he arrived in Utah 
for open-heart surgery. R. 133-37, 140. Instead, Allen was 
"blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply because it is 
so illogical." Kempson v. North Carolina Department of Human 
Resources, 397 S.E. 2d. 314f 318 (N.C. 1990). 
In his dissenting opinion in this case, Judge Bench agreed 
that a resource spend down must be allowed if this unreasonable 
result is to be avoided: 
I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is 
reasonable since eligibility is determined by when the 
medically needy applicant applies for benefits. Under 
DHCF's policy, the applicant who is savvy enough to spend 
down his or her assets before applying for medicaid would 
be eligible, while the applicant who applies for benefits 
before spending down is not eligible. Because that 
agency policy is not reasonable, I would allow Allen to 
spend down his assets before his eligibility is 
determined. 
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
Allen, at 13. A standard for determining eligibility is not 
reasonable unless it includes the opportunity to offset excess 
resources against incurred medical expenses. See Sen. Rep. No. 
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2019 (states are not allowed to require the use 
of income or resources which would bring the individual's income 
below the amount set as the test of eligibility under the state 
12 
plan because this would reduce the person below the level 
determined by the state as necessary for his maintenance). A 
person who is unable actually to spend down his assets would become 
liable to the full extent of his resources, including resources 
which Congress intended to be retained by the applicant. In Haley 
the court said: 
The department's policy of determining eligibility 
without the application of a resource spend down does 
not comply with the requirement that an individual be 
allowed to retain a certain level of resources. 
Haley, 476 N.E.2d at 579. See also Walter 0. Boswell Hospital, 
Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 388, 714 P.2d 878, 881 
(1986) (a case concerning a county health program, where the court 
analogized to Medicaid law, interpreting the Medicaid Act under 
Haley as requiring a resource spenddown in order to comply with the 
requirement that an individual be allowed to retain a reasonable 
level of both resources and income). 
The Illinois Supreme Court, reached the same result in 
Hession; 
By failing to consider an individual's incurred 
medical expenses as well as his or her assets, the 
Department defeats the legislature's intent. Under the 
Department's policy, a Medicaid applicant possessing 
resources in excess of the asset disregard is found to 
be ineligible for medical assistance despite the fact 
that the applicant may have incurred medical expenses 
which far exceed his or her resources. Because the 
applicant is not eligible for assistance, he or she 
becomes personally responsible for paying these bills 
and is required to deplete the assets which the 
13 
legislature intended to be disregarded. 
In contrast, by allowing an applicant to spend down 
the assets above the disregard with incurred medical 
expenses the applicant is entitled to Medicaid benefits 
once the medical expenses exceed the excess in assets. 
Thus an individual is allowed to retain a certain level 
of assets and is personally liable for his or her medical 
expenses only to the extent that his or her resources 
exceed permissible limits. Considering the legislature's 
intent that the medically needy be allowed to retain some 
of their assets, we conclude that the Department must 
employ resource spend down methodology when determining 
Medicaid eligibility for these individuals. 
Hession, 129 111. 2d at 549-50, 544 N.E.2d at 758. 
The cases relied on by Allen approved of a resource spenddown 
for the fundamental reason that the exemption of certain assets so 
as to permit an individual to maintain a minimum level of income 
and resources while still qualifying for medical assistance is an 
inherent part of a medically needy program. See Walter 0. Boswell 
Hospital, Inc. v. Yavapai County. 148 Ariz. 385, , 714 P.2d 878, 
883 (1986); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 
535, , 544 N.E.2d 751, 758 (1989); Haley v. Commissioner of 
Public Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, , 476 N.E.2d 572, 579 (1985). 
The Court of Appeals erred in its reading of these cases and its 
conclusion that each contains a "state mandate for vresource spend 
down' based on a specific legislative directive within their 
Medicaid plans" is unwarranted. Allen, at 9. The DHCF regulations 
providing for the exemption of certain assets so that a claimant 
14 
can maintain a certain level of resources while remaining eligible 
for medical assistance are a sufficient basis for permitting a 
resource spend down in Utah. Utah Administrative Code § R810-304-
411 (1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
as recommended by Judge Bench, Allen at 12-13 (Bench, J., 
dissenting), and find that a resource spenddown applies and that 
the Appellant should have been allowed to spend down his assets. 
He should have been allowed to reduce his assets so as to become 
eligible for Medicaid. 
Dated this jgfK day of Apy^ \ 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Steven Elmo Averett 
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DENr - ASSETS EZCE-ED LIHITS 
DEAR DOYCE ALLEN 
YOUR APPLICATION FOR HEDICAL ASSISTANCE, RECEIVED ON FEBRUARY 04, 
1991, HAS 3EEN DENIED. THIS IS BECAUSE THE VALUE OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD'S 
TOTAL RESOURCES IS MORE THAN OUR POLICY ALLOWS. 
YOUR RESOURCES 
RLSOUdCc L l f l lT 
$10,745.90 
$3,000.00 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT 
801 374 7800. COLLECT CALLS WILL BE ACCEPTED. 
THIS AC::0.< IS 3ASED ON VOLUHE IIIF, SECTIONS 503 AND 361, 70LUME 
HID, SECTION 503, LSD VOLUflE Ilia, SECTION 502. 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Suzanne Dandoy. M.D.. M.P.H. 
Ex<vuuvr Director 
Rod Beiit 
Director 
utflLfe h Ul U U 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
288 North 1460 West 
P.O. Box 16580 
Sal! Lake City. Utah 84118-0580 
(801)538-6151 
D0YCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
AND ORDER ON REVIEW 
Case No. 91-067-01 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A RECONSIDERATION 
FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS 
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A 
PETITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS 
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR 
A RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU M Y DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE 
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6151. 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 
63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review -
Procedure," and Department of Health Administrative Rule RA54-14, entitled 
"Division of Health Care Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for 
Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and Providers." 
WAS THE OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT (OFS) CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE 
PETITIONER WAS OVER THE ASSET LIMIT? 
' • • ' • • I 'IN DINGS C I !: CT 
The Findings of Fact entered by the presiding officer In Recommended Decision 
No. 91-067-01 are hereby incorporated >w refprence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Conclusions of La w entered by the presiding officer in Recommended 
Decision No 9] -067-01 are hereby incorporated by reference. 
DISPOSITION 
WHEREFORE, Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 is hereby AFFIRMED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
The rules regarding asset limits are set forth in Assistance Payments 
Administration (APA) Volume III, Section 503. Section 503-1 states in 
relevant part: 
To be eligible for medical assistance, a client's 
countable assets must be less than the applicable asset 
limits.... 
Section 503-2 states in relevant part: 
Use assets held on the first moment of a calendar month 
to compute eligibility for that month. The case is 
ineligible for the entire month if countable assets 
exceed limits on the first moment of the month.... 
The table in Section 503-3 indicates that the Medicaid asset limit for a 
household of two individuals is $3,000. 
In this case, the petitioner and his wife held over $3,000 in a savings 
account at the first moment of the month for the months of January and 
February, 1991. Jherefore, the decision of 0FS to deny Medicaid disability 
benefits because of excess assets was correct. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Action and Crder 
on Review is issued, you may file a written request for reconsideration with 
the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. Any request for 
reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking 
judicial review. 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of 
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action 
and Order on Review or, if a request for reconsideration is filed and denied, 
within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall 
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the 
specific grounds upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition 
within the 30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of any right to appeal 
the Final Agency Action and Order on Review. 
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A copy of this Final Agency Action and Order on Review shall be sent to 
Petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail, 
return receipt requested. 
DATED this ^ 9 ^ day of April, 1991 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director 
Rod Betit, Director 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Her Designated and Authorized Representative 
0414H/115-117 
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DOYCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
RECOMMENDED DECISION 
CASE NO. 91-067-01 
Pursuant to Rule R454-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah 
Administrative Hearing Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above 
captioned case was held on the 3rd day of April, 1991, at the Office of Family 
Support located at 150 East Center Street, Provo, Utah, at 10:00 o'clock in 
the A.M., Cornelius W. Hyzer, Hearing Officer, presiding. The petitioner 
appeared in person. The Office of Family Support/Utah Medical Assistance 
Program ("UMAP") was represented by Jon Wood and Patti Richards. This hearing 
was scheduled verbally and without written notice. Neither party was 
represented by counsel. 
ISSUE 
WERE THE ASSETS OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE THE ASSET LIMIT FOR THE MONTHS OF 
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1991? 
The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife, Lilly, have severe medical 
problems. She is receiving Social Security disability benefits for chronic 
bronchitis* She is on continuous oxygen for this disorder. She also has to 
be transported to a warmer climate in the winter time when an inversion takes 
place in the Utah County because of her condition. To accomplish this 
purpose, her husband, Doyce Allen, purchased a 1983 Ford pick-up truck and a 
travel trailer. They paid $8,000.00, for the travel trailer two years ago. 
He and his wife used the cash from her Social Security disability hearing to 
do that. The hearing process to obtain Social Security disability required 
them to go to the administrative law judge, and by the time benefits were 
granted, the retroactive benefits exceeded $8,000.00. 
Doyce Allen worked at Intermountain Farmers Co-op for many years and was 
covered under Blue Cross/Blue Shield medical insurance. In 1990, he obtained 
a part-time job with his former employer and reapplied for Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield benefits. He was covered under COBRA benefits until July 1, 1990. A 
letter was sent by his employer with the application on June 15, 1990. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield denied his application for benefits for medical insurance. 
He looked for other insurance and determined that it would cost between 
$400.00 or $500.00 a month for medical insurance, and therefore, he never 
applied. He testified at the hearing that an application to one of these 
other companies may have been denied regardless of the amount of the premium 
he would have been willing to pay. 
In January, 1991, the petitioner suffered a heart attack and had heart-bypass 
surgery. This medical bill remains unpaid. 
The petitioner applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. His income 
was not evaluated, but at the hearing it was determined there would be a 
substantial spendown required in the range of $400.00 to 450.00. The asset 
limit for a family of two is $3,000.00, and the Office of Family Support 
determined that he exceeded that on the basis of his savings account alone. 
The savings account contained $3,029.86 throughout the month of January and up 
to February 6, 1991, at which time Mrs. Allen withdrew the entire balance of 
that account. 
The petitioner was informed at the hearing that the rule for asset 
determination requires that the evaluation take place on the first moment of 
the first day of each month and, therefore, because the funds in his checking 
and savings account were in excess of $3,000.00, the case was properly 
denied. Considerable discussion was also entertained on the use of the truck 
and travel trailer for medical purposes, but the amount of the money in the 
savings account alone exceeded the limit, and therefore, the issue of medical 
necessity was moot. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife Lilly, age 52, applied 
for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. 
2. The application of the petitioner included a request for retroactive 
benefits for January, 1991, to cover approximately $40,000.00 in medical 
bills incurred at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for open-heart 
surgery. 
3. Lilly Allen, the petitioner's wife, is currently on Social Security 
Disability and requires continuous oxygen for chronic bronchitis, as well 
as trips to warmer climates during the winter time as a medical necessity. 
4. The petitioner and his wife held $3,029.00 in a savings account and 
approximately $100.00, in a checking account the first moment of each of 
the months of January and February, 1991. 
5. The petitioner owns a 1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately 
$2,500.00, which could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile 
and a $7,000.00, 1981 travel trailer. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The assets of the petitioner and his spouse exceed the $3,000.00, asset limit 
as set forth in APA Volume HID. 
REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION 
The petitioner was unable to demonstrate his assets were below the asset limit 
and, therefore, he failed to meet his burden of proof. Many alternatives were 
explored to try to determine that a correct decision was made by the Office of 
Family Support. After careful review with the petitioner of regulations 
requiring that his assets be determined as of the first moment of each month, 
the petitioner understood that his savings account alone exceeded the limit. 
Therefore, the value ascribed to his motor vehicles and the travel trailer 
were not necessary to sustain a denial. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
The decision of the Office of Family Support to deny Medicaid benefits because 
of excess assets is hereby AFFIRMED. 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the 
Recc—ended Decision and a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of 
that review, will be released simultaneously by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing. 
DA7ZZ this ' day of April, 1991. 
CORNELIUS W. HYZER 
HEARING OFFICER 
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EXHIBITS 
The following exhibits were admitted 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT #1 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT //2 
into evidence: 
Medicaid application of the petitioner, 
Doyce Allen 
Checking account and savings account 
bank statements 
0404H/105-108/amh 
Norman H Banjitrttr 
Gcnrrnor 
Suzanne Dandoy. M D. M P H 
ExcctiUvr Dirrvfor 
Rod Bern 
Director 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
288 North 1460 West 
PO Box 16580 
San Lake City. Utah 841160580 
(801)538-6151 
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D0YCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 91-067-01 
-00O00-
This request for Reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63--6b-13 Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
FACTS 
The Facts set forth in Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 are here: 
incorporated by reference. 
DISPOSITION 
The above-captioned Request for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
The petitioner, age 64, became uninsurable and had a heart attack on January 
23, 1991, while visiting in Arizona. The petitioner and his wife had enough 
money to return to Utah for bypass surgery. Throughout January, 1991, and up 
to February 6, 1991, the petitioner and his wife had $3,029 in_a savings 
account and approximately $100 in a checking account. After applying for 
Medicaid on February 4, 1991, the petitioner's wife immediately withdrew all 
the money in the savings account and closed the account. Medicaid regulations 
require that the assets of an applicant be examined at the first moment of the 
month to determine whether or not they exceed the asset limit. The asset 
limit for the type of Medicaid requested was $3,000.00, leaving excess assets 
In addition to the excess assets in the checking and savings account, there 
were other potential excess assets an unencumbered trailer home worth 
approximately $7,000.00, and an automobile worth $600,00. At the formal 
hearing, the petitioner contended that the trailer was a medical necessity. 
The hearing officer's Recommended Decision correctly denied the petitioner's 
claim solely on the amount of cash available to him, without reaching the 
medical necessity issue. 
The Utah Medicaid Program is funded by a combination of state and federal 
funds. Unfortunately, federal regulations do not allow consideration of 
individual circumstances in the application of income and asset limits. A 
Medicaid agency must use a methodology for the treatment of resources that is 
uniform for all individuals in a covered group. When income eligibility is 
the issue, a Medicaid recipient may spenddown excess income each month to 
"buy" a medical card. However, no such provisions exists to reduce assets. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of 
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Response to Request 
for Reconsideration. The petition shall be served upon the Director of Health 
Care Financing, Utah Department of Health and shall state the specific grounds 
upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 
30-day time limit may constitute a wavier of any right to appeal this decision. 
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the 
petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail, 
return receipt requested. 
DATED this day of June, 1991 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director 
By ; ^df^u^ 
Rod Betit, Director 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Her Designated and Authorized Representative 
0448H/43-44 
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No: 91-067-01 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of June, 1991, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Response to Request for Reconsideration, postage 
prepaid, to the following parties: 
Rod Betit, Director 
Division of Health Care Financing 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Doyce Allen 
689 Canyon Drive 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Brian Farr 
Office of the Attorney General 
DHS, 4th Floor 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Bob Banta 
DHS, Office of Family Support 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Stephanie Mallory 
DHS, Administrative Hearings 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Jeanie LeBlanc, Medicaid Supervisor 
DHS, Quality Control 
INTER OFFICE MAIL 
Mike O'Brien, Associate Regional Director 
Office of Family Support 
150 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Jon Wood, Supervisor 
Office of Family Support 
150 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Ginny DTSrcan 
0379H/26 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
MAR 1 T 1 9 9 2 
Doyce Al l en , 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care 
Financing, 
Respondent. 
C^Wtfry 7 .%k>onan 
Ctitk c: tfcs Court 
Utafi Court c; Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publ icat ion) 
Case No. 910287-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 17, 1992) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from a final order of 
respondent Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing (DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart atrack while in 
Arizona. He was subsequently transported to Utah where he 
underwent heart bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs 
exceeding $4 0,000.00. At the time of his heart attack, Allen had 
no health insurance and was ineligible for Medicare assistance 
because he was not sixty-five years old. 
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991, 
seeking retroactive coverage to include medical bills incident to 
his heart surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid guidelines 
require that Alleys assets be less than $3,000.00, on the first 
of each calendar month, to qualify for medical assistance. In 
both January and February, Allen owned a savings account in the 
amount of $3,029.86, a checking account in the amount of $100,00, 
a Lincoln automobile valued at approximately $600.00, a 1983 Ford 
pickup truck valued at approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel 
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00. 
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family Support denied 
Allen's Medicaid application, finding his resources exceeded the 
$3,000.00 limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after which a 
DHCF hearing officer sustained the denial on the ground that 
Allen's "savings account alone exceeded the limit." On April 29, 
1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency Action and Order on Review, 
adopting the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer. 
Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied. 
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in denying his 
Medicaid application because: (1) The savings account funds are 
designated for burial expenses and, thus, exempt from 
consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel trailer, 
modified to accommodate his wife's disabilities, is a medical 
necessity or personal effect and, thus, exempt from consideration 
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have been permitted 
to "spend down" his assets, by applying them to medical bills, in 
order to become eligible for Medicaid. 
I. THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A BURIAL FUND 
Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings account should not 
be included for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because it is 
exempt as a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen points 
to a statement in his will directing that the savings account be 
used "to bury Doyce Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the 
will is properly before this court on appeal because it was 
submitted to the DHCF with his Request for Reconsideration. The 
DHCF responds that it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's 
will as part of the record on review because it was never 
introduced as evidence at Allen's formal administrative hearing. 
A review of the record reveals that a copy of Allen's will 
was first presented to the DHCF as an attachment to a letter from 
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requesting a transcript of 
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 burial or 
funeral fund exemption for each eligible household member" is 
permitted only if these funds "are separately identified and not 
commingled with other funds. They must be clearly designated so 
that an outside observer can see that these funds are 
specifically for the client's burial expense." Utah Code Admin. 
P. R810-304-411(9) (e) (1) (1991). 
Allen's administrative hearing. The DHCF did not receive the 
will until June 10, 19912, after the hearing officer's 
Recommended Decision, the DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on 
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request for Reconsideration 
had already been signed and dated. Because there is no 
indication that Allen's will was ever included as evidence before 
the DHCF, it is not properly a part of Allen's record on appeal. 
However, even if we were to consider the general language in 
Allen's will, the result would not be different. Allen clearly 
and unequivocally testified the account was to pay for insurance 
premiums, not burial expenses. Allen did not specify the account 
as a burial fund on his original Medicaid application. During 
his formal administrative hearing, Allen did not argue or present 
any evidence indicating his savings account was designated for 
burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing officer specifically 
asked if the savings account might be a burial fund, Allen 
replied that "we earned it last summer for our insurance 
premiums, and they didn't go through, so we had this money for a 
nest egg, you might say. You have to have a little bit of 
something in case—."3 Therefore, considering only the savings 
2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time when the 
record was still open," pointing out that the letter to which the 
will was attached was mailed on June 3, 1991. The letter, 
nevertheless, clearly bears a "Received June 10, 1991" stamp. 
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF denied Medicaid 
benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain the account as a 
burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the 
administrative hearing: 
HEARING OFFICER: What did you do with the 
$3,000 in February which you pulled out of 
the savings account? 
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that was 
accrued during our heart attack deal here, 
and transportation to and from. 
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money was spent on 
medical things? 
MR. ALLEN: Bills again. 
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently neither 
considered nor used the savings account as a fund "separately 
identifiable" which was set aside "specifically" for burial 
expenses. 
Q T n~> on —r>7i 
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account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, Allen's savings 
account alone surpassed the $3,000.00 Medicaid limit. 
II. MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN" 
A. An Overview of the Medicaid Program 
Allen alternatively argues that he should have been 
permitted to spend his assets on medical bills in order to 
qualify for Medicaid. We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid 
regulations to resolve this question. 
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program as Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act.5 Medicaid is a cooperative 
federal-state program providing federal funds to assist 
individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet 
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
(1992). States choosing to participate in this optional program 
are reimbursed for a portion of their costs in providing medical 
treatment to needy persons. See Atkins v. Rivera. 477 U.S. 154, 
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber Memorial Care Ctr., 
Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Participating states must develop a plan that complies with 
all federal Medicaid regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins, 
477 U.S. at 157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 P.2d at 
832. Each state must also select a single agency "to administer 
or to supervise the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a) (5) (1992). In determining eligibility for its 
program, a state must provide benefits to the "categorically 
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped with 
oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport Allen and his wife 
to a warmer climate during winter because of his wife's ill 
health, should be excluded from Medicaid eligibility 
consideration because they are exempt either as personal effects 
or medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411(4), 
(5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen asserts that, because 
his wife requires the truck and travel trailer for health 
reasons, neither vehicle is "available" to him, as contemplated 
by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17)(B) (1992). We find it unnecessary to reach these 
issues in view of our determination that Allen's savings account 
alone exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit. 
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396, et seq. (1992)). 
needy"6 but may provide benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its 
discretion.8 
B. The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal Medicaid Statutes 
When a "medically needy" applicant's income or resources 
exceed the applicable state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the 
"spend down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the applicant may 
be able to "spend down" excess income or assets, by applying them 
to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for Medicaid. 
In determining whether the federal Medicaid program requires 
states to adopt the "spend down" rule, courts have focused on the 
following portion of the Medicaid statutes: 
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must 
(17) . . . include reasonable standards 
. • . for determining eligibility for and the 
extent of medical assistance under the plan 
which (A) are consistent with the objectives 
of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking 
into account only such income and resources 
as are . . . available to the applicant or 
recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable 
evaluation of any such income or resources, 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i). 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). 
8. The United States Supreme Court explained this distinction in 
Schweiker v. Hoaan. 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2597 (1982): 
Congress has differentiated between the 
categorically needy—a class of aged, blind, 
disabled, or dependent persons who have very 
little income—and other persons with similar 
characteristics who are self-supporting. 
Members of the former class are automatically 
entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter 
class are not eligible unless a State elects 
to provide benefits to the medically needy 
and unless their income, after consideration 
of medical expenses, is below state standards 
of eligibility. 
Id., 457 U.S. at 590, 102 S. Ct. at 2609. 
91n9«7-ra 
and (D) • . . provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to 
income by taking into account . . . the costs 
. . . incurred for medical care or for any 
other type of remedial care recognized under 
State lav. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis added). Courts 
recognize section 17(D) as the "income spend down rule," finding 
that state plans must permit a Medicaid applicant to "spend down" 
or deplete excess income to comply with a state's eligibility 
standards.9 
The question in the present caser however, is whether the 
federal Medicaid regulations also require states to allow an 
applicant to "spend down" excess resources in the same manner. 
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid program requires states 
to implement "resource spend down" because it is necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program and is reasonable. 
The DHCF responds that federal Medicaid regulations mandate 
"income spend down" but merely permit states to incorporate 
"resource spend down" within their plans at their discretion. 
9. See, e.g., Atkins. 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct. at 2459 ("the 
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17)" allows the 
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income 
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler. No. 83-C-4736, 
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986)("42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a) (17) (D) requires states to use income spend-down"); 
Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me. 
Nov. 9, 1990) (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) (D) "specifically requires 
the state to have an income spend-down rule"); Walter O. Boswell 
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 
878, 881 (Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementing [42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(17)] expressly require deduction of incurred 
medical bills from inccmo for purposes of determining 
eligibility."); Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 
285, 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990)("Under the ^medically needy7 
procedure, applicants are permitted to xspend down' their excess 
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down 
principle to income eligibility determinations"); Kempson v. 
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397 
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1990)(The "explicit reference to income [in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D)] has been interpreted by the courts to 
mean that * income spend-down' is allowed by the statute."), 
aff'd, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991). 
Courts considering the issue agree with the DHCF, finding 
the express statutory mandate is limited to "income spend 
down."10 Courts conclude that federal Medicaid regulations 
permit, but do not require, states to employ "resource spend 
down."11 We agree and conclude "resource spend down" is not 
mandated by federal law. 
10. Legislative history accompanying section 1396a(a)(17) points 
to only "income spend down" as a mandatory federal requirement. 
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943. 
11. See, e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down but is 
silent regarding resource spend-down . . . . Resource spend-down 
is thus permitted, but not required, by the Medicaid statute and 
regulations"); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("The federal statute 
specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down 
rule, . . . But there is no similar requirement in the federal 
statute for a resource spend-down rule."); Hession v. Illinois 
Dept. of Pub. Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757 
(1989)("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in section 
1396a(a)(17) which precludes a State that participates in the 
Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology 
if it chooses to do so."); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub. Aid, 
163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("section 
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan to utilize resource 
spend down in determining an applicant's eligibility for medical 
assistance benefits"), aff'd. 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 
(1989); Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me. 
1991)(court adopts prior holding of district court in this case 
that federal Medicaid statute "only permits, and does not 
require, a state to use an asset spend-down"); Bemowski v. 
Department of Pub. Welfare. 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106 
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the medically needy 
by participating States is optional and may be excluded entirely 
from a State's Medicaid program"). 
But see Ramsey, 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds "no authority 
in any category for a * spend-down' of excess resources that is 
similar or identical to the expressly authorized * spend-down' of 
excess income"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops short of 
holding "resource spend down" discretionary, stating that, 
although "§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) only mentions income in instructing 
states to provide flexibility in their program application 
standards, we note that § 1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's 
plan must *provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income 
or resources'"). 
Q1 flOQ-7— r»* 
C. Utah's Medicaid Program 
Since Utah may implement "resource spend down" at its 
discretion, we must determine whether the Utah Medicaid plan has, 
in fact, adopted "resource spend down" in determining Medicaid 
eligibility. Utah courts have never addressed Medicaid "spend 
down" issues. 
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid program with the 
adoption of the Medical Assistance Act in 1981.h Utah has 
complied with federal requirements by creating a state plan13, 
which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for 
Medicaid administration.14 Utah's statutes describe the DHCF's 
responsibilities, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[T]he division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of 
this chapter in an efficient, economical 
manner. The division shall establish, on a 
statewide basis, a program to safeguard 
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of 
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and 
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital 
admissions or lengths of stay. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989). 
12. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -11 (1989 and Supp. 1991). 
13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to -48 (1991). Utah has 
elected to provide assistance to the "medically needy." See Utah 
Code Admin. P. R455-1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has 
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination, 
including the burial fund discussed earlier, are listed at Utah 
Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991). 
14. "[T]he Division of Health Care Financing . . . shall be 
responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the 
Medicaid program . . . in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 
(1989)(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(1) 
(Supp. 1991)("The department shall be the single state agency 
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in 
connection with the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act.")(emphasis added). 
(2) The department shall develop implementing 
policy in conformity with this chapter, the 
requirements of Title XIX, and applicable 
federal regulations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added). 
The department may develop standards and 
administer policies relating to eligibility 
under the Medicaid program. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989). 
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule 
indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend 
down" in determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen posits 
a more delicate argument which goes beyond literal statutory 
language. Specifically, Allen contends that Utah will not be 
following the federal requirement to use "reasonable standards" 
in determining Medicaid eligibility unless it applies "resource 
spend down." 
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's Medicaid plan 
designates certain assets as exempt in determining eligibility 
for the "medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that Utah has 
tacitly adopted a policy of allowing "medically needy" Medicaid 
applicants to maintain a level of income and resources for the 
necessities of life while still qualifying for Medicaid. 
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases from other 
jurisdictions which, he argues, require "resource spend down" 
because, like Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid 
eligibility determination. We read these cases differently. 
Courts in these jurisdictions have found a state mandate for 
"resource spend down" based on a specific legislative directive 
within their Medicaid plans, not just on the practice of allowing 
exemptions. 
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 394 Mass. 466, 
476 N.E.2d 572 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its own state 
Medicaid laws to determine if "resource spend down" was mandated 
or simply permitted. The court, first, determined that, although 
the federal statutes did not require "resource spend down," it 
was a reasonable method of calculating resources and "consistent 
with the goals of Title XIX." Id., 476 N.E.2d at 578. 
Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine 
15. £ee Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991). 
independently whether the Legislature intended to require the use 
of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. The court found a 
statute "explicitly applfying] a resource spend down," id. n.9, 
as evidence of "the legislature's determination to ensure an 
individual's retention of a certain level of resources." Id. at 
579. The court, thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid plan 
required "resource spend down." 
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an analysis similar 
to that of the Halev court in Hession v. Illinois Department of 
Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After 
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not 
require, "resource spend down," the court turned its attention to 
the Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized that the plan 
included a provision whereby $1,500 in assets is exempt from 
Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court, relying 
upon a specific Illinois statute, also stated: "In establishing 
an assistance program for these individuals, the legislature has 
noted that it is of special importance that their incentives for 
continued independence be maintained and that their limited 
resources be preserved.11 Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111. 
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on this clear 
manifestation of legislative intent, the court held that the 
Illinois Medicaid plan required "resource spend down." 
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource spend down" 
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy 
expressing a desire to preserve the resources of potential 
beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those outlining 
16. In fact, one commentator states: 
It is not only conceivable, but a fact that 
some unprepared applicants' assets are 
reduced beyond the poverty level to 
bankruptcy because medical bills in that 
month exceed those resources which the 
applicant cannot preserve under the Utah 
Exemptions Act. It [is] to the applicant's 
advantage to put forth any plausible argument 
that a particular value should be counted as 
income rather than asset, if the reverse 
would result in excess assets. Excess assets 
mean a denial of Medicaid eligibility; excess 
income means that the applicant will be 
required to shoulder more of [his or] her 
health care costs for that month. 
Ken Bresin, Utah's Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility 
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988) 
(emphasis added)(footnote omitted). 
the DHCF's authority17, seem to evince a legislative concern for 
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the 
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring 
"resource spend down," on the contrary, appear concerned about 
preserving the limited assets of Medicaid applicants. 
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was 
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt "resource spend 
down" in an otherwise completely optional state benefit plan. 
The expressed legislative concern is for economy and efficiency 
in implementing a Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this 
line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power. 
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to that of Maine, 
recently reviewed in Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 
1991). In Harriman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
recognized that its state plan does not include "resource spend 
down." "If the assets of applicants exceed the specified dollar 
limit, they are ineligible for assistance under the medically 
needy program, regardless of the amount of their medical 
expenses." Id. at 1056. Noting that "[t]he overall effect was 
to restrict as much as possible the number of eligible Medicaid 
recipients," the court stated: "For whatever reason—whether to 
achieve cost containment or to comply only with the federal 
mandate or through simple oversight—the legislature stopped 
short of enacting an asset spend-down." Id. at 1057 (footnote 
omitted). 
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing in the Utah 
Medicaid plan or its regulations that requires the utilization of 
"resource spend down."18 Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings 
17. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 2 6-18-2.3(1) quoted above. 
18. We agree with most courts which have considered the issue 
and believe the adoption of "resource spend down" is good public 
policy. See e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spend-
down provision furthers the general purpose of the Medicaid 
program); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Clearly, if the goal of 
Medicaid is to assist individuals who are medically needy— 
defined as having insufficient income or resources to meet the 
cost of necessary medical services—the sensible solution is the 
spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 N.E.2d at 823 (a state's 
adoption of resource spend down "would be in conformity with the 
purpose and spirit of the Act"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318 ("Our 
review of the case law reveals a pattern where Medicaid 
applicants are blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply 
because it is so illogical. Applicants who otherwise qualify are 
(continued.. .) 
account at the time he applied for Medicaid. The DHCF, thus, 
correctly determined he was ineligible for Medicaid benefits as 
Utah has not adopted a "resource spend down" system. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in 
part): 
I concur with part I of the main opinion and dissent from 
part II. 
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may have been eligible 
for Medicaid by spending down his or her assets is a policy 
decision delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) 
(1989). We review for reasonableness an agency's policy based on 
a legislative grant of discretion to interpret a statute. See 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1991).l 
18. (...continued) 
denied coverage because they have several hundred dollars above 
the reserve asset limit while at the same time they are liable 
for tens of thousands of dollars worth of medical bills."). 
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility criteria 
for Medicaid benefits is not one for the courts to make. 
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an expression of intent to limit 
coverage. The Legislature's concern for economy and efficiency 
in the administration of the program simply does not have any 
logical relationship to the intended coverage of the program. 
I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is reasonable 
since eligibility is determined by when the medically needy 
applicant applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, the 
applicant who is savvy enough to spend down his or her assets 
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the 
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not 
eligible. Because that agency policy is not reasonable, I would 
allow Allen to spend down his assets before his eligibility is 
determined. 
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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B810-304-411. Exempt Assets. 
Kdlow the following exemptions for medical assis-
tance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See 
!§ection 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent Medi-
.^ EaVcases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use 
jgi£F or C policy. 
* *One Home and Lot — All Cases 
xclude one home, including a mobile home, and 
tSwned or being purchased and occupied by the 
Sent 
fF and C Cases — The lot on which the home 
j shall not exceed the average size of residential 
arin the community where it is. Count the equity 
tffiejof property exceeding an average size lot. 
^A,~B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all 
iious property. 
inpt a life estate in a home if the owner of the 
ate continues to live in the home. 
fOne Home and Lot of a Person Who is A Resi-
fdenT^ Sf a Medical Institution — All Cases 
SgTOenaperson who owns a home, or life estate in a 
liome, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the 
home or life estate becomes countable unless: 
tVL.The person's stay in the medical institution will 
be~short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says 
that"the client is likely to return home within 6 
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution 
more than 6 months after admission is long term, or 
-J)7The person states that he intends to return 
home. It does not matter whether the person actually 
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit 
to this exemption. The statement of intent must be in 
.writing from the client or his representative, or 
', .c^The person has a spouse, dependent child, or rel-
i v e * who lives in the home. 
.0. Water Rights — All Cases 
S Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot. 
^-jfelative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, 
s^tepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, step-
mother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece, 
iS?P&©w, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sis-
jgS&krother, stepbrother, or stepsister 
^^Hou8ehold Goods and Personal Effects 
gand C Cases 
dude the contents of the home that are essential 
ugJiving. However, individual items with an 
^J&over $1,000 must be counted against the asset 
iP, and D Cases 
?«ude household goods and personal effects only 
* ^extent they do not exceed $2,000. 
^developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no 
- ^ items with a value (as can be currently sold) of 
$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt 
amount to be exceeded. 
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or 
more, then consider all other household goods and 
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the 
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and 
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards 
the household's asset level. 
5. Vehicles 
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to 
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to pro-
vide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any 
equity value in excess of this amount towards the 
household's asset limitation. _ 
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regard-
less of value if: 
a. It is necessary for employment; or 
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year 
for obtaining medical treatment; or 
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person. 
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or 
other such factors to provide transportation for essen-
tial daily activities. 
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above rea-
sons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market 
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value 
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess to-
wards the asset limit. 
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards 
asset limits. 
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases 
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust 
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan. 
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable 
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund 
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9^. 
7. Life Insurance 
A. B, and D Cases 
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the 
total face value of all such policies does not exceed 
SI.500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds 
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all 
that individual's policies against the asset limit. Up 
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used 
as a burial'funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term in-
surance policies have no cash value, are not re-
sources, and are not used in any way in determining 
countable assets. 
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be 
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral 
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)). 
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy 
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid 
on the cash value is greater than that used to com-
pute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the 
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of 
policies that have been held for a long time. When 
there is countable cash value that, combined with 
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you 
should obtain a current statement of the cash value 
F and C Cases 
Count the cash value of life insurance policies. 
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases 
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to 
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for 
any member of the client's immediate family. This 
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave 
markers, etc. Also, if a client owns a grave site, the 
value of which includes opening and closing, the 
value of these services is also excluded. 
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include 
many of the items exempted in this section. However, 
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these types of contracts are merely promising these 
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.) 
and are considered to be a part of the contract or plan. 
They are not evaluated separately. They are consid-
ered for exemption under Section 411, (9). 
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases 
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption for 
each eligible household member. Compute this burial 
or funeral fund exemption as follows: 
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable bur-
ial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund ex-
emption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at 
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral 
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go 
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable 
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an 
asset. 
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce 
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by 
the total face value of any exempt whole life insur-
ance policies. If the face value of these policies ex-
ceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemp-
tion to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c. 
The amount of face value which exceeds the remain-
ing burial or funeral fund exemption level is not 
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and 
C categories as life insurance is already counted. 
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable 
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life in-
surance policies there is still a balance in the burial 
or funeral fund exemption, reduce the remaining ex-
emption level by, the cash value of any burial con-
tract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial. 
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash 
value of non-exempt life insurance policies. 
e. If these reductions result in an exemption 
greater than S 1,500 then the difference is to be added 
to the other countable assets. 
11 Any interest which is accrued on an exempt 
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for 
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset or 
as income. 
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are sepa-
rately identified and not commingled with other 
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an 
outside observer can see that these funds are specifi-
cally for the client's burial expense. 
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or inter-
est from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan, 
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy 
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their 
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the ac-
count must be counted as income. The amount re-
maining in the fund is still exempt. 
If a client has a previously unreported resource 
which he claims is to be used for burial: 
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being 
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it 
was either designated or intended for burial. How-
ever, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and 
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of 
application. 
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D' case and the re-
source is not clearly designated as being for burial, it 
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the 
first day of the month the client intended to set it 
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before 
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2 
years prior to the date of application. 
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Cases 
Exclude ownership of beneficial interest in f5J2l 
land or account which is held in trust by the United 
States, a state, or in a tribal account. i3ft3 
11. Per Capita Tribal Payments '-^jm 
Exlude all per capita payments or any asset purl 
chased with per capita payments made to a tzibSu 
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribal 
12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act —-~ADj 
Cases r S j 
Exclude shares received as payment under.thai 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public LaVJ 
92-203). ->a 
13. Income Producing Property — A,B, and Dj 
Cases "2-jJ 
Exclude income producing property from assets! 
when the individual's equity in the property does not] 
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual] 
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any] 
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 peroaoM 
net annual return* is met. If it is not then count the] 
entire equity amount. - ^ 
Net annual return: The income produced after] 
subtracting mortgage payments or other payments] 
necessary to generate income. -j£& 
14. Retroactive Social Security Benefits — AH] 
Cases .-3^ 3 
Exempt lump sum retroactive benefits received] 
from the Social Security Administration (SSA and; 
SSI) for 6 months after the month of receipt -f' 
15. Student Benefits 
All Cases 
Do not count monies from certain sources to un< 
graduate students as assets. These sources incli 
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships-; 
have funds guaranteed by the U.S Commission 
Education, including: 
— Pell Grants (Formerly BEOG) a 
— SuDolemental Educational Opportunitv G; 
SEOG-" ' 'rs 
— National Direct Student Loans <NDSL< Z£ 
— Guaranteed Student Loans ^ 
— Stare Student Incentive Grants (SSIG1 
b Payments to participants of a service le. 
program, such as College Work Study or Universil 
Year for Action (UYA). 
A, B. and D Cases 
Count any monies which remain after the 
period covered from an educational grant, 1( 
scholarship as an asset. 
16. Pension Funds — A, B and D Cases 
Do not count money held in a retirement fund; 
der a plan administered by an employer or union, 
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh'^ 
count owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A,' 
or D medical. 
a. Count as an asset any available money vii\_ 
drawn from the pension starting the month afterit 
withdrawn. 
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) 
Cases 
Do not count any asset, or the interest fr 
asset, which is held within the rules of the U; 
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any mori< 
the asset given to the child as unearned 
Uniform Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable 
money or property to a child under the age of % 
gift can be made to only one child, with on" 
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form 
includes a statement that the custodian holds 
set for the child under the Utah UGMA rul 
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Mi 
or Social Services. 
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• B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments 
l t state, or local government programs if 
j of the payment is so the client can pay for 
f
 or social services. This includes payments for 
[J rehabilitation. Exclude these payments 
-e calendar month following receipt. Do not 
"this • exemption with reimbursements for 
or social services; money received as reim-
t must be counted as a resource the first 
^following receipt. 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 29. Oral argument 
i a) In general. Oral argument will be 
all cases unless the court concludes: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
(2) The dispositive issue or set of •-
been recently authoritatively decid 
(3) The facts and legal argumen 
quately presented in the briefs and 
the decisional process would not bef^  
aided by oral argument. 
(b) Priority of argument. Cases 
uled for oral argument in accordance 
ing list of priorities: 
(1) Appeals from convictions 
death penalty has been imposed; 
(2) Appeals from convictions in I 
nal matters; 
(3) Appeals from habeas corpus 
other post-conviction proceedings; 
(4) Appeals from orders concerning 
UTAH* RULES OF APPELLATE" PROCEDURE Rule 31 
zj-t (5) Matters relating to the discipline of attor-
[!>" (6) Matters relating to applicants v* o have 
failed to pass the bar examination; 
(7) Petitions for review of Industrial Commis-
ergion orders; 
r* (8) Appeals from the orders of the Juvenile 
^Cburt; 
&»>'(9) Appeals from actions involving public elec-
Itions; 
jcp.-(lO) Petitions for review of Public Service 
J?~ Commission orders; 
§V* (ID Appeals from interlocutory orders; 
gV (12) Questions certified to the Supreme Court 
&v by a court of the United States; 
§* - (13) Original writ proceedings; 
y: • (14) Petitions for certiorari that have been 
# granted; 
\\v (15) Petitions to review administrative agency 
t~, orders not included within other categories; and 
*>.. (16) Any matter not included within the above 
j g categories. 
f*(c) Notice by clerk and request by a party for 
argument; postponement Not later than 30 days 
jpriorjto the term of court in which a case is to be 
[submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties 
sfhat oral argument is to be permitted, the time and 
jplace of oral argument, and the time to be allowed 
[each side. Oral argument shall proceed as scheduled 
[unless all parties waive the same in writing filed 
[with the clerk not later than 15 days from the date of 
tthe clerk's notice. A request for postponement of the 
'argument or for allowance of additional time must be 
fmade by motion filed reasonably in advance of the 
relate fixed for hearing. 
§|^(d).Order and content of argument. The appel-
lant is entitled to open and conclude the argument 
?The opening argument shall include a fair statement 
soothe .case. Counsel will not be permitted to read at 
|&ngth from briefs, records or authorities. 
|^[(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or sepa-
prate appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at 
'asingle argument, unless the court otherwise directs 
If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the 
action below shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purpose of this rule unless the parties otherwise 
agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate ap-
pellants support the same argument, care shall oe 
taken to avoid duplication of argument. 
(f) Non-appearance of parties. If the appeilee 
fails to appear to present argument, the court will 
hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present 
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear 
argument on behalf of the appellee, if present. If nei-
ther party appears, the case may be decided on the 
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be re-
scheduled for argument. 
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the 
Parties, a case may be submitted for decision on the 
briefs, but the court may direct that the case be ar-
gued. 
-.(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; re-
. movaL If physical exhibits other than documents are 
L*o be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to 
^have them placed in the courtroom before the court 
• convenes on the date of the argument. After the argu-
fy feent, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the 
[courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If ex-
Hiibits are not reclaimed by counsel within a reason-
t *ble time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall 
the destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk 
&*aall think best. 
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transfer the case, including the record and file of 
the case from the tnal court, all papers filed in 
the Court of Appeals, and a written statement of 
all docket entries in the case up to and including 
the certification order, to the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court The Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk of 
the trial court that the case has been transferred 
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification, 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall enter the 
appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court 
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall immedi-
ately send notices to all parties and to the clerk 
of the trial court that the case has been docketed 
and that all further filings will be made with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court The notice shall 
state the docket number assigned to the case in 
the Supreme Court The case shall proceed before 
the Supreme Court to final decision and disposi-
tion as in other appellate cases pursuant to these 
rules 
(4) If the record on appeal has not been filed 
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the 
date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial 
court that upon completion of the conditions for 
filing the record by that court, the clerk shall 
transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court If, however, the record on appeal 
has already been transmitted to and filed with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the date of 
the entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals shall transmit the record on 
appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 
five days of the date of the entry of the order of 
transfer 
(c) Criteria for transfer The Court of Appeals 
shall consider certification onlv in the following 
cases 
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is 
apparent that the case should be decided by the 
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court 
would probably grant a petition for a writ of cer 
tiorari in the case if decided by the Court of Ap 
peals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals 
might rule, and 
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other 
cases involving the same legal issue or issues 
pending in the district courts, juvenile courts cir 
cuit courts, or the Court of Appeals or which are 
cases of first impression under state or federal 
law which will have wide applicability 
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued ap-
peals. 
If a notice of appeal or a petition for re\ lew is filed 
in a timely manner but is pursued in an appellate 
court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the 
appellate court, either on its own motion [orj on mo 
tion of anv party, shal1 transfer the case, including 
the record on appeal all motions and other orders 
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with 
appellate jurisdiction in the case The clerk of the 
transferring court shall give notice to all parties and 
to the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring 
the case The time for filing all papers in a trans-
ferred case shall be calculated according to the time 
schedule of the receiving court 
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and de-
crees of Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a 
judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to 
as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be initi-
ated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of Utah 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certioran is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only for special and important reasons The following, 
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law, 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law m a 
way that is in conflict with a decision of the Su-
preme Court, 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision, or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled bv 
the Supreme Court 
Rule 47 Certification and transmission of 
record; filing; parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and ser-
v ice Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the tune 
provided b> Rule 48 pay the certiorari docketing fee 
and file ten copies of a petition w hich shall comply in 
all respects with Rule 49 The case then will be placed 
on the certiorari docket Counsel for the petitioner 
shall serv e four copies of the petition on counsel for 
each party separatelv represented It shall be the
 ; 
duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties 
in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari 
docket number of the case Serv ice and notice shall be 
given as required b\ Rule 21 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties inter-
ested jointlv, severally, or otherwise m a decision 
mav join in a petition for a writ of certiorari, any one 
or more of them maj petition separatelv or any two 
or more of them mav join in a petition When two or 
more cases are sought to be reviewed on certioran 
and involve identical or closelv related questions, it 
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certio-
rari covering all the cases 
io Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a 
respondent wishing to file a cross-petition shall, 
within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pav the certi-
orari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari which shall comply in all 
respects with Rule 49 The cross-petition will then be 
placed on the certiorari docket Counsel for the cross-
petitioner shall serve four copies of the cross-petition 
on counsel for each party separately represented. & 
shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to 
notify all parties in the case of the date of the filM 
and of the certiorari docket number of the case. SeH 
vice and notice shall be given as required by R^6^?3 
A cross-petition for a writ of certioran may n<*~3jj 
joined with any other filing, the clerk shall not accepjj 
any filing so joined
 # *%!! 
(d) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in •"5 
Court of Appeals shall be deemed parties in the S** 
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TITLE XIX. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This Title is referred to in 7 USCS §§ 2026, 3178; 8 USCS § 1522: 12 USCS 
§§1715w, 1715z-7: 25 USCS §1622; 38 USCS §§622, 4108: -2 USCS 
§§ 242b, 254a-1, 254b, 254c, 254e, 254h, 254n, 300e, 300e-6, 300m-6. 300z-5. 
602, 603, 606, 614, 632a, 671, 671, 673, 705, 709, 1301, 1306, 1308, 1309, 
1310, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1320a-l, 1320a-2, 1320a-3, 1320a-5, 1320a-7. 1320a-
7a, 1320a-8, 1320b-2, 1320b-3, 1320b-4, 1320b-5. 1320c-2, 1320c-10, 1382. 
13S2g. 1382h, 1382i, 1383c, 1395b-l, 1395%. 1395x, 1395y,-1395z !395cc. 
139:>mm. 1395H, I395w. 1395ww, 1997, 3013. 3026, 3035b,'$624 
§ 1396. Appropriations 
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the 
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of 
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individu-
als, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help 
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or 
self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year 
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et 
seq.]. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making 
payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the 
Secretary, State plans for medical assistance. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, P. L. 
89-97, Title I, Part 2, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343: Dec. 31, 1973, P. L. 93-233, 
§ 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, Division B. Title VI. 
Subtitle D, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.) 
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(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all 
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of 
applicants or recipients of assistance under the plan who are nor 
receiving aid or assistance under anv plan of the State approved under 
title I. X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [^ 2 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to 
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under 
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between 
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility 
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are 
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B) 
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, 
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any applicant 
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for 
aid or assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the 
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], 
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income 
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]) as would not be 
disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility 
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evalua-
tion of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account 
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or 
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient 
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or 
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(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program 
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in 
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not 
eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into 
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs 
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under 
State law; 
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(17) except as provided in subsections (0(3). and (mX4)[,J include reasonable standards (which shall 
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under 
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I, 
X. XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV (42 USCS §§ 301 ct seq.. 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et 
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid 
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban 
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the 
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.]. (B) provide 
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for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with] 
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any! 
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance tnj 
the form of money payments under any plan of the State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, ofj 
part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq.. 1201 ct seq., 1351 ct seq., 1381 et seq.. 601 et seq.]. or tol 
have paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS] 
§§ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining hisl 
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, ( Q provide for reasonable evaluation of any suchl 
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual] 
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is suchj 
individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to Slates eligible tol 
participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or] 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c],' 
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such program); and provide for 
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except 
to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums;' 
payments made to the State under section 1903(0(2XB) [42 USCS § 1396b(Q(2)(B)]. or otherwise and 
regardless of whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of the State or 
political subdivision thereof) incurred for medical care or for any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law; 
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(34) provide that in the case of any individual who has been determined 
to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan, such assistance will 
be made available to him for care and services included under the plan 
and furnished in or after the third month before the month in which he 
made application (or application was made on his behalf in the case of a 
deceased individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon 
application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the time 
such care and services were furnished; 
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ARTICLE 3 
TESTS OF NEWBORN INFANTS 
26-17-21. PKU tests of newborn infants — Board of Health 
to establish rules and regulations. 
The Board of Health shall establish rules and regulations requiring each 
newborn infant to be tested for the presence of phenylketonuria ''PKU) and 
other metabolic diseases which may result in mental retardation or brain 
damage and for which a preventive measure or treatment is available and for 
which a laboratory diagnostic test method has been found reliable 
History: L. 1965, ch. 49, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, Cross-References. — Fees for and restric-
tion on testing, ^ 26-10-6 
26-17-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 26-17-22 (L 1965, ch 
49, § 2), relating to the penalty for violations 
of regulations relating to PKU tests, was re-
pealed by Laws 1967, ch 174, § 162 
CHAPTER 18 
MEDIGAL ASSISTANCE ACT 
Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-7 for the termination date of the Medical Assistance Act. 
Section 
26-18-1. Short title. 
26-18-2. Definitions. 
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment 
spo risibilities. 
26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Em-
phasis — Periodic assessment. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid pro-
gram by department. 
26-18-3.5. Copayments by health service re-
cipients, spouses, and parents. 
26-18-4. Department standards for eligi-
bility under Medicaid — Funds 
for abortions. 
26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical 
services — Federal provisions 
Section 
Re- 26-18-6. 
26-18-7. 
26-18-8. 
26-18-9. 
26-18-10. 
26-18-11. 
modifying department rules — 
Compliance with Social Secu-
rity Act 
Federal aid — Authority of execu-
tive director. 
Medical vendor rates. 
Enforcement of public assistance 
statutes — Contract with Office 
of Recovery Services. 
Prohibited acts of state or local 
employees of Medicaid program 
— Violation a misdemeanor. 
Utah Medical Assistance Pro-
gram — Policies and standards. 
Rural hospitals. 
26-18-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch, 126, § 17. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1981, 
&- 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to 
26-18-4 (L. 1963, ch. 38, §§ 1 to 4; 1969, ch. 
197, §§ 64, 65; 1971, ch. 53, § 1), relating to 
use of confidential information in research. 
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted 
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by § 17 of the act. For present provisions relat-
ing to confidential information, see Chapter 25 
of this title. 
26-18-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the 
medical programs of the state. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the 
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1. 
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be 
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assis-
tance for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant 
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act. 
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or pay-
ments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance 
under state medical programs. 
(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital 
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L. Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assis-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1. tance Program established under Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- 26-J18-10" for "the department has determined 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, added present to be eligible for medical or hospital assistance 
Subsections (2) and (3), designated former Sub- under the medical programs of the state " 
sections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6), Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
and, in Subsection (6), substituted "has re- eral Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
ceived medical or hospital assistance under the U S C § 1396 et seq 
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care Fi-
nancing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and main-
taining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program 
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988. ch 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 2. makes the act effecti\e on July 1, 1988 
26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities. 
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of 
the department. The director of the division may employ other employees as 
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall: 
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this 
chapter; 
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and 
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in 
compliance with federal law and regulations. 
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History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 3. makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Peri-
odic assessment. 
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economi-
cal manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to 
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, ex-
cessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that 
fail to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity 
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to 
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with 
regard to both publicly and privately provided services. 
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods, 
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to: 
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utili-
zation is reasonable and necessary; 
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions; 
(c) mandatory ^ Jifcltatient, rather than inpatients surgery in appropm 
ate cases: 
(d) second surgical opinions; 
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services; 
(f) coordination of benefits; and 
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who 
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures 
and provisions of federal law and regulation. 
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effective-
ness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider 
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services 
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreason-
able utilization. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10 
1988, ch. 21, § 4. makes the act effective July 1, 1988. 
Social Security Act. — Title XIX of the fed-
eral Social Secuntv Act is compiled as 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 et se'q. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regula-
tions. 
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(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Social Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permit-
ted by law and quality control services. 
(4) The department may provide by rule for disciplinary measures and 
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and proce-
dures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively shall 
not extend beyond termination from the program or recovery of claim reim-
bursements incorrectly paid. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5. federal agency" and made various minor phra-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- seology and stylistic changes, 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, in Subsection (2) Social Security Act. — Title XIX of the fed-
substituted "this chapter, the requirements of
 e r a i Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations" U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
for "the requirements of Title XIX and with 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 81 C J.S. Social Security and Pub-
lic Welfare § 126. 
Key Numbers. — Social Security «=» 241 
26-18-3.5. Copayments by health service recipients, 
spouses, and parents. 
The department shall selectively provide for*enrollment fees, premiums, 
deductions, cost sharing or other similar charges to be paid by recipients, their 
spouses, and parents, within the limitations of federal law and regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 135, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative 
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L Rev 115, 169 
26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Medi-
caid — Funds for abortions. 
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating 
to eligibility under the Medicaid program. An applicant receiving Medicaid 
assistance may be limited to particular types of care or services or to payment 
of part or all costs of care determined to be medically necessary. 
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or 
other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons 
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the life of 
the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed. 
216 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT 26-18-5 
(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abor-
tion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor and subject to forfeiture of office. 
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical treat-
ment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is guilty 
of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice medicine 
or authority to provide medical services and treatment. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L. minor changes in phraseology throughout the 
1981, ch~ 126, § 17; 1987, ch. 181, § 2. section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Cross-References. — Penalties for misde-
ment deleted former Subsection (1), relating to meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
the responsibility of counties, redesignated the Sentencing for felonies, §§76-3-201, 
subsequent subsections accordingly and made 76-3-203, 76-3-301 
26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical services — 
Federal provisions modifying department rules 
— Compliance with Social Security Act. 
(1) The department may contract with other public or private agencies to 
purchase or provide medical services in connection with the programs of the 
division. Where these programs are used by other state agencies, contracts 
shall provide that other state agencies transfer the state matching funds to 
the department in amounts sufficient to satisfy needs of the specified pro-
gram. 
(2) AU contra©tevfor the provision or purchase of medical services shalLbe** 
established on the basis of the state's fiscal year and shall remain uniform 
during the fiscal year insofar as possible. Contract terms shall include provi-
sions for maintenance, administration, and service costs. 
(3) If a federal legislative or executive provision requires modifications or 
revisions in an eligibility factor established under this chapter as a condition 
for participation in medical assistance, the department may modify or change 
its rules as necessary to qualify for participation; providing, the provisions of 
this section shall not apply to department rules governing abortion. 
(4) The department shall comply with all pertinent requirements of the 
Social Security Act and all orders, rules, and regulations adopted thereunder 
when required as a condition of participation in benefits under the Social 
Security Act. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-5, enacted by L. tuted "its rules as necessary" for "department 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 6. rules necessary/' 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Social Security Act — The federal Social 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sen- Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et 
tence of Subsection (1) substituted "division" geq. 
for "department" and in Subsection (3) substi-
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26-18-6. Federal aid — Authority of executive director. 
The executive director, with the approval of the governor, may bind the 
state to any executive or legislative provisions promulgated or enacted by the 
federal government which invite the state to participate in the distribution, 
disbursement or administration of any fund or service advanced, offered or 
contributed in whole or in part by the federal government for purposes consis-
tent with the powers and duties of the department. Such funds shall be used 
as provided in this chapter and be administered by the department for pur-
poses related to medical assistance programs. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. 
26-18-7. Medical vendor rates. 
Medical vendor payments made to providers of services for and in behalf of 
recipient households shall be based upon predetermined rates from standards 
developed by the division in cooperation with providers of services for each 
type of service purchased by the division. As far as possible, the rates paid for 
services shall be established in advance of the fiscal year for which funds are 
to be requested. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-7, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sen-
.J.B3JU ch. 126, *> 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 7. tence twice-substituted "dmsion" for "depart-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- ment" —^» **>».-. 
26-18-8. Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Con-
tract with Office of Recovery Services. 
(1) The department shall enforce or contract for the enforcement of the 
provisions of Sections 62A-9-121, 62A-9-129, 62A-9-131 through 62A-9-133, 
and 62A-9-135 insofar as these sections pertain to benefits conferred or ad-
ministered by the division under this chapter. 
(2) The department may contract for services covered in Part 1, Chapter 11, 
Title 62A insofar as that chapter pertains to benefits conferred or adminis-
tered by the division under this chapter 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-8, enacted by L. The 1988 amendment b> Chapter 21, effec-
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 1, § 2; 1988, ch. tive July 1, 1988, substituted "division" for 
21, § 8. "department" throughout the section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- This section has been reconciled by the Of-
ment by Chapter 1, effective January 19, 1988, f l c e o f Legislative Research and General Coun-
substituted the present statutory references for se* 
"Sections 55-15a-24, and 55-15a-29 through 
55-15a-33" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 15c 
of Title 55" in Subsection (2). 
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26-18-9. Prohibited acts of state or local employees of 
Medicaid program — Violation a misdemeanor. 
Each state or local employee responsible for the expenditure of funds under 
the state Medicaid program, each individual who formerly was such an officer 
or employee, and each partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited for 
a period of one year after termination of such responsibility from committing 
any act, the commission of which by an officer or employee of the United 
States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a 
partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by Section 207 or Section 
208 of Title 18, United States Code Violation of this section is a class A 
misdemeanor 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-9, enacted by L. ment by federal officers or employees in their 
1981, ch. 126. $ 17. official capacity in matters in which they have 
Compiler's Notes. — 18 U S C §§ 207 and
 a personal financial interest 
208 deal respectively with participation by for- Cross-References. — Penalty for misde-
mer federal officers or employees in matters meanors, H 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
involving the government and with mvolve-
26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies 
and standards, 
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be 
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons who 
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act. 
(2) Persons in the^custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other non-
medical government institutions are not eligible for services provided under-
this section 
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relat-
ing to eligibility requirements for participation in the program, and for pay-
ment of medical claims for eligible persons. 
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is ren-
dered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the 
spouse, father, mother, and adult children of the person making application. 
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or ser-
vices are covered under the program, including duration of care, and method 
of payment, which may be partial or in full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospi-
tal, or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible 
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an 
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion 
were not performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this 
section. 
History: C 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. § 17), relating to duties of the department, and 
1982, ch. 26, § 1; 1985, ch. 165, § 38; 1987, enacted present § 26-18-10. 
ch. 181, § 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9. Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982, ment substituted "equivalent of .00005" for 
ch- 26, § 1 repealed former § 26-18-10 (C. "equivalent of V4 mill" in two places in Subsec-
1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, tion (6). 
219 
26-18-11 HEALTH CODE 
The 1987 amendment, effective July 1,1987, 
in Subsection (1), substituted "Medicare under 
Title XVm of that act" for "Medicare under 
Title XVII of said act," deleted former Subsec-
tion (6), which provided for relief of the obliga-
tion of counties to provide medical care to the 
indigent, and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation throughout the section. 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988, 
substituted "division" for "department" in Sub-
sections (1) and (4) and in Subsection (1) in-
serted "which shall be known as the Utah Med-
ical Assistance Program." 
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the fed-
eral Social Security Act, cited in Subsection 
(1), appears as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396s. Ti-
tle XVm of the act appears as 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395 to 1395ccc. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah's 
Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility 
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. 
L. 1 (1988). 
26-18-11. Rural hospitals. 
(1) For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a hospital located 
outside of a standard metropolitan statistical area, as designated by the 
United States Bureau of the Census. 
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program, the Division of Health Care Financing shall not discriminate among 
rural hospitals on the basis of size. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-11, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 12, § 1. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 12, § 2 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988. 
CHAPTER 19 
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Section 
26-19-1. 
26-19-2. 
26-19-3 
26-19-4. 
26-19-5. 
26-19-6. 
26-19-7. 
26-19-8. 
Section 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Program established by depart- 26-19-9 to 
ment — Promulgation of rules. 26-19-13. 
Repealed. 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Notice — Action — 26-19-14 
Compromise or waiver — Re-
cipient's right to action pro-
tected — Limit on payment for 
liability. 26-19-15. 
Action by department — Notice to 
recipient. 26-19-16 
Action or claim by recipient — 
Consent of department required 26-19-17. 
— Department's right to inter-
vene — Department's interests 26-19-18. 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs. 
Statute of limitations — Survival 
of right of action — Insurance 
policy not to limit time allowed 
for recovery 
26-19-12. Repealed 
Recovery of medical assistance 
payments from recipient — 
Lien against estate — Recovery 
of incorrectly paid amounts. 
Insurance policies not to deny or 
reduce benefits of persons eligi-
ble for state medical assistance 
— Exemptions. 
Attorney general or county attor-
ney to represent department. 
Department's nght to attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Application of provisions contrary 
to federal law prohibited. 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by provider restricted — 
Liability for violation. 
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CHAPTER 17 
MENTAL HEALTH 
(Repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162; 1969, ch. 197, § 187; 1971, ch. 172, § 27; 
1988, ch. 1, § 407; 1989, ch. 22, § 51.) 
26-17-1 to 26-17-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 22, § 51 repeals 3 to 7, and 9; 1967, ch. 174, §§ 36 and 147; 
this chapter, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 54 1980, ch. 30, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, § 3; and 1981, 
and by Laws 1987. ch. 180, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, ch 120, § 3, effective April 24, 1989. For 
§ 8. and 1967, ch. 174, § 153 and as amended Dresent comparable provisions, see Chapter 12 
by Laws 1969. ch. 197, §§ 60 and 63; 1979, ch. of Title 62 A. 
233.* l:1987,ch 141, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, §§ 1, 
CHAPTER 18 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-226 provides that the Medical Assistance Act is repealed July 1. 
1994 
Section plinary measures and sanctions 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid pro- — Funds collected, 
gram by department — Disci-
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
Minset"Act:~=^—Section 63-55-226 provides 
that the Division of Health Care Financing is 
repealed July 1, 1994. 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment — Disciplinary measures and sanctions — 
Funds collected. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regula-
tions. 
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permit-
ted by law and quality control services. 
(4) The department shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and sanc-
tions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures 
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of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not 
extend beyond: 
(a) termination from the program; 
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and 
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social 
Security Act. 
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of 
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the Greneral 
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance 
with the requirements of that section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989, 
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a) 
and (b) designations in Subsection (4); substi-
tuted "shall provide, by rule" for "may provide 
by rule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not 
extend" in the introductory language of Sub-
section (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsec-
tion (4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-
tion (4)(b); added Subsection (4)(c); made punc-
tuation changes throughout Subsection (4); 
and added Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Sub-
section (3). 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U S.C. 
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r. 
CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
Section 
26-19-2. 
26-19-5. 
26-19-7 
Definitions 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Lien — Notice — Ac-
tion — Compromise or waiver 
— Recipient's right to action 
protected 
Action or claim b\ recipient — 
Consent of department required 
Section 
26-19-18 
— Department s right to inter-
vene — Department's interests 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by pro\ ider restricted — 
Exception — Liability for viola-
tion 
26-19-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under 
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act. 
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal 
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest. 
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from 
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a 
recipient. 
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical 
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal 
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and 
survivors if he is deceased. 
(5) "Third party" means: 
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63-46b-16. Judic ia l review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings . 
(1) As provided by s ta tute , the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action result ing firom formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resul t ing from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petit ioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rule* 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rule* of the appropriate 
pellate court shall govern all additional,f 
and proceedings in the appellate court sL . 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing^jf 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adraL_ 
tive proceedings are governed by the UtabRuKg 
Appellate Procedure, except that: '-• *..••)& 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or oi 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost 
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably*re?, 
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize of'1 
organize the record; or -\ 
(ii) according to any other provision of« 
law. .^-r! 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if oV* 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a i 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially ] 
prejudiced by any of the following: * 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on I 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-1 
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-" 
tion conferred by any s ta tute; -
 t 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; * 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an un lawfu l ' p^ 
cedure or decision-making process, or hasT 
*o follow prescribed procedure; 
f» the persons taking the agency actfol 
iegalh constituted as a decision-making 
r A ere subject to disqualification; "rf 
g) the agency action is based upon a del 
-.azion of fact, made or implied by the~j_ 
*"^a: is not supported by substantial" evidence; 
N-cn Mewed in light of the whole record before 
-c court, 
- trie agencv action is —--JJSS 
l* an abuse of the discretion delegatedjKM 
rie agenc\ D% statute, ^ r * £ 
n) contrary to a rule of the a g e n c y ; ^ § | 
' in) contrary to the agency's prior^PJJfU 
nee, unless the agency justifies the inconr"* 
tency by giving facts and reasons thatjcU 
onstrate a fair and rational basis for thenu 
consistency, or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capriciousr'l**. 
78-2a-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
—Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is suffi-
ciently broad to include those cases where a 
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas 
corpus proceeding challenging extradition. 
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals lacked original appel-
late jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of 
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate 
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to 
his underlying criminal conviction, except that 
"but for" the conviction, he would not have 
been incarcerated in Arizona and then trans-
ferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court 
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the post-
conviction actions of the board of pardons and 
did .not challenge the conviction in the trial 
court or the sentence, and the fact that defen-
dant was serving a sentence for a first-degree 
felony did not require a transfer to the Su-
preme Court under the circumstances. North-
ern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 47. 
Post-conviction review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This statute defines the outermost limits of 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review. It is not a catchall provision authoriz-
ing the court to review the orders of every ad-
ministrative agency for which there is no stat-
ute specifically creating a right to judicial re-
view. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Ap-
peals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Sentence reduction. 
When a conviction is reduced under 
§ 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having 
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in 
the judgment of conviction and for which de-
fendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of 
crime charged in the information or found in 
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1991). 
Cited in Scientific Academy of ftair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242* (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d 
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall 
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
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For text of Act sec p. 305 
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965) 
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE 
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965 
Senate July 9, July 28, 1965 
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out. 
S E N A T E REPORT NO. 40 i 
HE Ccrrmittee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H R. 6675 > 
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social 
Security Ac: with a supplementary health benefits program and an ex-
panded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the Federal-
State public assistance programs, and for other purposes, having consid-
ered the s?^e report favorably thereon with amendments and recommerJ 
that the b:'. cc pass. 
PART I 
I. BRIEF SUMMARY 
The overall purpose of H.R. 6675 is as follows: 
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical 
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new 
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the 
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other 
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical 
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled, 
and families with dependent children. 
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled 
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-year 
program of ''special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care 
and services for needy children (including those who are emotionally dis-
turbed) of school age or preschool age. 
« 
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6. IMPROVEMENT AND E X T E N S I O N OF KERR-MILLS 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(a) Background 
The provision of medical care for the needy has long been a responsi-
bility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years, 
the Federal Government has assisted the States and localities in carry-
ing this responsibility by participating in the cost oi the care provided. 
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the States, 
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could 
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act 
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in be-
half of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children—the so-
called vendor payments. 
Several times since 1950, the Congress has liberalized the provisions 
o: law under which the States administer the State-Federal program of 
medical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was 
in 1960 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program 
was authorized. This legislation offers generous Federal matching to 
o* able the States to provide medical care in behalf of aged persons who 
rave enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for 
:r-. heal care costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 States 
:r.d 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged 
were aided in March 1965. Furthermore, medical care as a part of the 
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years 
v:t*il, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some 
items of medical care for at least some of the needy. 
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which 
States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make medical 
services for the needy more generally available. To accomplish this ob-
jective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a 
new title in the Social Security Act—'Title X I X : Grants to the States 
for Medical Assistance Programs." 
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967, 
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching 
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would 
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the 
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate 
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and 
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent 
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently 
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Pro-
grams of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be 
optional with the States. 
(b) State plan requirements 
(1) Standard provisions 
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of require-
ments for State plans which are either identical to the existing provi-
sions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are: 
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State. 
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for 
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness. 
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary 
may from time to time require. 
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or 
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to pur-
poses directly connected with the administration of the plan. 
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance 
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such as-
sistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness. 
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be 
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye cr 
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select. 
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc 
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom. 
(2) Additions to standard provisions 
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the 
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either 
new or changed over provisions currently in the law. 
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State 
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expendi-
tures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial par-
ticipation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This pro-
vision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local 
funds for financing of any part of the program not afTect the amount, 
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the 
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider 
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire non-
Federal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives, 
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent 
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy. 
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles 
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods 
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the 
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the require-
ment that such methods must include provisions for utilization of pro-
fessional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is im-
portant that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified per-
sonnel in the administration of the program including both medical and 
other professional staff. 
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan in-
clude a description of the standards, methods, and administrative ar-
rangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in 
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no author-
ity to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect 
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is some-
what analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assist-
ance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requir-
ing States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing raid maintaining standards for private or public institutions in which 
recipients may receive care or services. 
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after June 
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standards 
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) re-
lating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and safe-
ty of individuals, which are established by the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare. The committee assumes that the standards pre-
scribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those pre-
scribed by the Secretary. 
The House bill provided that the State or local agency administering 
the State plan under title XIX shall be the same agency which is cur-
rently administering cither title I (old-age assistance) or that part of 
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medical 
assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relat-
ing to the aged is State supervised, the same State agency shall super-
vise the administration of title XIX. 
The committee believes that the States should be given the opportun-
ity to select the agency they wish to administer the program. A number 
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief 
that the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility 
under this program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to 
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility 
for medical assistance be made by the State or local agency administer-
ing State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees 
with the statement in the House report that the welfare agencies have 
''long experience and skill in determination of eligibility/' 
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on 
the date a State submits its title XIX plan, the State agency administer-
ing or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind un-
der title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the 
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new 
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or super-
vise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which re-
lates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining 
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered 
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan. 
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agen-
cies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types 
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under 
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to 
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care 
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of 
care in many medical institutions arc not now at a satisfactory level and 
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will 
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these stan-
dards will be enforced by the appropriate State body. 
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include 
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and 
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was 
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use 
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the ef-
fect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for 
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions 
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the qual-
ity of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this 
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive 
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such pro-
cedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with med-
ical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to 
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of 
services under the State plan. 
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation of all State 
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation. 
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance 
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include 
provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or as-
sistance under State plans approved under titles I, IV, X / X I V , and XVI. 
It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical 
assistance to the less needy. 
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons 
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must not be less 
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid 
under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration, 
and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all 
such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy 
aided under the federally aided categories oi assistance. 
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their programs to 
include assistance for persons who come within the various categories of 
assistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet 
their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals 
shall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that mace avail-
able for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was in-
cluded in order to make sure, that the most needy in a State receive no 
less comprehensive care than those who are not as needy. 
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not re-
ceiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determina-
tion of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among 
the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recip-
ients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance pro-
grams. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be 
comparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a 
comparability for that set for families with children who, except for 
their income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope, 
amount, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these 
groups must be equal. 
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this pro-
vision as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in insti-
tutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participa-
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t:*jn is authorized only with respect to recipients aged 65 and over in 
rr.cntal and tuberculosis institutions so it would not be appropriate to 
include them within the scope of this provision. 
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance 
The committee bill would make more specific a provision now in the 
law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the 
plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives 
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources 
which individuals may hold and be eligible for aid, they must do so by 
maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy 
people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be 
that which is applicable for the eligibility of the needy aged, for example, 
shall be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the eligibil-
ity for the needy blind and disabled; and must also have a comparability 
to the standards used to determine the eligibility of those v. ho are to re-
ceive medical assistance as needy children and the parents cr other rela-
tives caring for them. 
Another provision is included that requires States to take into account 
<~-\\y such income and resources as (determined in accordance with stan-
dards prescribed by the Secretary), arc actually available to the applicant 
or recipient and as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future 
r.Leds) in determining the eligibility for and the amount of the aid or as-
sistance in the form of money payments for any such applicant or re-
cipient under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriately ap-
plicable to him. Income and resources taken into account, furthermore, 
must be reasonably evaluated by the States. These provisions are de-
signed so that the States will not assume the availability of income which 
may not, in fact, be available or overevaluate income and resources which 
are available. Examples of income assumed include support orders from 
absent fathers, which have not been paid or contributions from relatives 
which are not in reality received by the needy individual. 
The committee has heard of hardships on certain individuals by re-
quiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed 
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to sup-
port each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their 
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled chil-
dren even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for sup-
port may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for 
medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements 
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationsliips among 
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their 
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than 
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who arc blind 
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made 
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, will be taken into account 
by the State in determining whether the individual applying for medical 
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance. 
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weak-
nesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under 
the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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grams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the fi-
nancial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income 
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided un-
der the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the 
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical as-
sistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the 
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the 
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the con-
sideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the 
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical 
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the 
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or oth-
erwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligi-
ble for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be 
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both 
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the 
medical care he requires. 
This determination must be made by the agency administering the old-
age assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency. 
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the indi-
vidual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount. 
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that de-
scribed below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items 
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources 
which would bring the individual's income below the amount established 
as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce 
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for 
his maintenance. 
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit 
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any 
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan. 
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with re-
spect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This pro-
vision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States 
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided under 
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hos-
pital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the 
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that 
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or re-
sources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level) 
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall 
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary 
and included in the State plan. 
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a 
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the 
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income 
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment 
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital 
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this 
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provision, which it is expected will protect the income and resources an 
individual has which are necessary for his nonmedical needs. 
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisions 
of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in connection 
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits. The committee is 
concerned that hospitalization be readily available to needy persons and 
that the necessity of their pa\ing deductibles or cost sharing shall not be 
a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their receiving the 
hospitalization they need. For this reason, the committee's bill provides 
that the States make provisions, for individuals 65 years or older who 
are included in the new plan, of the cost of any deductible or cost sharing 
imposed with respect to individuals under the program established by the 
hospital insurance provisions of the bill. 
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payment in full 
of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program estab-
lished by part B of title XVIII . In the event, however, the State plan pro-
\idcs for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, such portion 
shall be determined on a basis reasonably related to the individual's in-
come, or income and resources and in conformity with stardards issued 
by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to issue standards—under 
this provision which, it is expected, will protect the income and resources 
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the States. Such 
standards shall protect the income and resources of the indhidual needed 
for his maintenance and provide assurance that the responsibility placed 
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burden on them. 
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged pro-
gram now provide that the States may not impose a lien against the 
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical as-
sistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning in-
correct payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts cor-
rectly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death and 
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee bill, 
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recovery would be 
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is under the 
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
(e) Scope and definition of medical services 
"Medical assistance'* is defined under the bill to mean pa\ment of all 
or part of the cost of care and sen-ices for individuals who would if 
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), and 
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 406(b) 
(1) with whom the child is living, or who arc 65 years of age and older, 
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and re-
sources are insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, as 
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of med-
ical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the individ-
ual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the program 
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children as 
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and their 
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except for 
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